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LAW’S HALO AND THE MORAL MACHINE
Bert I. Huang * 
How will we assess the morality of decisions made by artificial 
intelligence—and will our judgments be swayed by what the law 
says? Focusing on a moral dilemma in which a driverless car chooses to 
sacrifice its passenger to save more people, this study offers evidence that 
our moral intuitions can be influenced by the presence of the law. 
INTRODUCTION 
As a tree suddenly collapses into the road just ahead of your driver-
less car, your trusty artiﬁcial intelligence pilot Charlie swerves to avoid 
the danger. But now the car is heading straight toward two bicyclists on 
the side of the road, and there’s no way to stop completely before hitting 
them. The only other option is to swerve again, crashing the car hard 
into a deep ditch, risking terrible injury to the passenger—you. 
Maybe you think you’ve heard this one. But the question here isn’t 
what Charlie should do. Charlie already knows what it will do. Rather, the 
question for us humans is this: If Charlie chooses to sacriﬁce you, throw-
ing your car into the ditch to save the bicyclists from harm, how will we 
judge that decision?1 Is it morally permissible, or even morally required, 
because it saves more people?2 Or is it morally prohibited, because 
Charlie’s job is to protect its own passengers?3 
                                                                                                                           
 *  Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Intellectual Life, Columbia 
Law School. I wish to thank Benjamin Minhao Chen, Jeanne Fromer, Jeffrey Gordon, Scott 
Hemphill, Benjamin Liebman, Frank Pasquale, and the editors of this journal for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. For excellent research assistance, as well as insightful 
conversations about artiﬁcial intelligence, I thank my former students Abed Balbaky, Katy 
Berk, Jennifer Dayrit, Caitrianne Feddeler, Andrea Nishi, Philippe Schiff, and Jeffrey Stein. 
For funding, I am grateful to the Richard Paul Richman Center at Columbia University. 
 1. This framing of the thought experiment focuses our inquiry on the psychology of 
public reactions to decisions made by artiﬁcial intelligence (AI). (What an autonomous 
system should do when faced with such dilemmas is the focus of much other work in the 
current “moral machine” discourse. See infra note 8.) In saying that Charlie already knows 
what it will do, I mean only what is obvious—that by the time such an accident happens, 
the AI pilot will have already internalized (through machine learning, old-fashioned 
programming, or other means) some way of making the decision. It is not positing that 
Charlie’s decision in the story is the normatively better one. Nor does this study presuppose 
that public opinion surveys should be used for developing normative principles for guiding 
lawmakers, AI creators, or the AI systems themselves. Rather, its premise is that our collective 
moral intuitions—including how we react after hearing about an accident in which the self-
driving car had to choose whom to sacrifice—might affect public approval of any such law or 
normative policy. 
 2. This particular version of the dilemma, posing a trade-off between passengers 
and outsiders, is pervasive in the public discourse about driverless cars. See, e.g., Karen 
Kaplan, Ethical Dilemma on Four Wheels: How to Decide When Your Self-Driving Car 
Should Kill You, L.A. Times (June 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la- 
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And what about the law—will our moral judgments be inﬂuenced by 
knowing what the law says?4 What if the law says that Charlie must mini-
mize casualties during an accident? Or what if the law says instead that 
Charlie’s priority must be to protect its passengers? 
In this Essay, I present evidence that the law can inﬂuence our moral 
intuitions about what an artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) system chooses to do 
in such a dilemma. In a randomized survey experiment, Charlie’s deci-
sion is presented to all subjects—but some are told that the law says the 
car must minimize casualties without favoring its own passengers; other 
subjects are told that the law says the car must prioritize protecting its 
own passengers over other people; and yet others are told that the law 
says nothing about this. 
To preview the ﬁndings: More people believe the sacriﬁce of the pas-
senger to be morally required when they are told that the law says a driver-
less car must minimize casualties without favoritism. And more people 
                                                                                                                           
sci-sn-autonomous-cars-ethics-20160623-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZSK7-SP8G]; 
John Markoff, Should Your Driverless Car Hit a Pedestrian to Save Your Life?, N.Y. 
Times (June 23, 2016),  http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/technology/should-
your-driverless-car-hit-a-pedestrian-to-save-your-life.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law 
Review); George Musser, Survey Polls the World: Should a Self-Driving Car Save Passengers, 
or Kids in the Road?, Sci. Am. (Oct. 24, 2018),  https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ 
survey-polls-the-world-should-a-self-driving-car-save-passengers-or-kids-in-the-road/ [https:// 
perma.cc/P57B-EQZV]. 
 3. In 2016, Mercedes-Benz found itself in a public relations mess as news stories 
trumpeted how a company representative had let slip that the company’s future self-driv-
ing cars would prioritize the car’s passengers over the lives of pedestrians in a situation 
where those are the only two options. Michael Taylor, Self-Driving Mercedes-Benzes Will 
Prioritize Occupant Safety over Pedestrians, Car & Driver (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a15344706/self-driving-mercedes-will-prioritize-occupant-
safety-over-pedestrians/ [https://perma.cc/KJB8-PY4Z]. What the executive actually said 
might be interpreted to mean that guaranteed avoidance of injury would take priority over 
uncertain avoidance of injury, and that this preference would tend to favor protecting the 
passenger in the car. See id. (quoting the executive as saying: “If you know you can save at 
least one person, at least save that one. Save the one in the car . . . . If all you know for 
sure is that one death can be prevented, then that’s your first priority”). Regardless, 
Daimler responded with a press release denying any such favoritism. Press Release, 
Daimler, Daimler Clariﬁes: Neither Programmers nor Automated Systems Are Entitled to 
Weigh the Value of Human Lives (Oct. 18, 2016), http://media.daimler.com/ 
marsMediaSite/en/instance/ko/Daimler-clarifies-Neither-programmers-nor-automated-
systems-.xhtml?oid=14131869 [https://perma.cc/CZ2G-YSVF]. 
 4. In prior work using a similar survey experiment, I have presented evidence that 
in a standard trolley problem dilemma (involving a human decisionmaker who can turn a 
runaway train), one’s moral intuitions about such a sacriﬁce can be inﬂuenced by knowing 
what the law says. Bert I. Huang, Law and Moral Dilemmas, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 659, 680–95 
(2016). In addition to the most obvious difference between the two studies (an auto-
nomous vehicle versus a human decisionmaker), the nature of their dilemmas also differs: 
The earlier study sets a moral duty to save more lives against a moral prohibition from 
harming an innocent bystander (and thus engages intuitions mapping onto such classic 
distinctions as act versus omission, or intended versus side effects); in contrast, this study 
sets a moral duty to save more lives against a moral duty to protect the passenger (and by 
design seeks to blur the classic distinctions). See infra section I.A. 
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believe the sacriﬁce to be morally prohibited when they are told instead 
that the law says the car must give priority to protecting its own 
passengers.5 
These ﬁndings give us a glimpse not of the law’s shadow but of the 
law’s halo.6 And if our moral intuitions about such dilemmas can be 
swayed by the presence of the law, intriguing implications follow. First is 
the possibility of a feedback loop, in which an initial choice about which 
moral principles to embed into the law (say, minimizing casualties) may 
come to alter our later moral judgments (say, upon hearing about a real-
life accident in which the AI chose to sacriﬁce the passenger), thereby 
amplifying approval of that same law and others like it. In this way the 
law may well become “a major focal point for certain pronounced socie-
tal dilemmas associated with AI,”7 as Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar 
predicts in his contribution to this Symposium, through its self-
reinforcing inﬂuence on our collective moral sense. 
By illustrating the potential inﬂuence of the law in how we judge AI 
decisions, moreover, this study also complicates the “moral machine” 
discourse in both its empirical and normative dimensions.8 On the 
                                                                                                                           
 5. See infra Part II. As for who people think should bear some of the moral respon-
sibility for the decision, see infra section II.A. 
 6. I borrow this illuminating phrase from Professor Donald Regan. See Donald H. 
Regan, Law’s Halo, in Philosophy and Law 15, 15 (Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul 
eds., 1987) (coining the phrase “law’s moral halo” to explain the “strong inclination” to 
“invest” law with moral signiﬁcance, even if one does not believe in a moral obligation to 
obey the law). For an insightful review of legal and empirical literature on the interplay 
between law and moral attitudes, see Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral 
Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and 
the Law 241, 253–58 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014). 
 7. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Common Law for the Age of Artiﬁcial Intelligence: 
Incremental Adjudication, Institutions, and Relational Non-Arbitrariness, 119 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1773, 1779 (2019). 
 8. This discourse addresses how AI systems should make decisions that involve 
moral or ethical issues. The empirical literature includes a remarkable recent study that 
used an online interface to collect millions of crowdsourced answers from around the 
world about what a driverless car should do in countless variations of such car-crash dilem-
mas. See Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza, Richard Kim, Jonathan Schulz, Joseph Henrich, 
Azim Shariff, Jean-François Bonnefon & Iyad Rahwan, The Moral Machine Experiment, 
Nature, Nov. 1, 2018, at 59, 59–60 (describing the setup of the Moral Machine interface 
and associated data collection). Again, it is very much open to question how such empiri-
cal findings might be used, if at all, to guide policymaking. For a small sampling of 
the growing normative literature, see generally German Fed. Ministry of Transport & 
Dig. Infrastructure, Ethics Commission: Automated and Connected Driving 
(2017),  https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/EN/publications/report-ethics-commission.pdf?__ 
blob=publicationFile [https://perma.cc/ET9P-WYM9] (developing normative principles for 
ethical decisionmaking by artificial intelligence systems in the context of driverless cars); 
Wendell Wallach & Colin Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong 
(2009) (same, but not limited to the specific context of driverless cars); Alan Winfield, 
John McDermid, Vincent C. Müeller, Zoë Porter & Tony Pipe, UK-RAS Network, Ethical Issues 
for Robotics and Autonomous Systems (2019),  https://www.ukras.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2019/07/UK_RAS_AI_ethics_web_72.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XZ6-KJTM] (same); 
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empirical front, these ﬁndings suggest that in investigating people’s intui-
tions about what an AI system should do when facing such a moral di-
lemma, their prior impressions about the law should be taken into ac-
count.9 Although most people might not yet hold any impressions about 
the laws of driverless cars, their awareness can be expected to grow in 
coming years, and even now they may already have in mind laws govern-
ing human drivers. On the normative front, overlooking the preexisting 
inﬂuence of the law on our moral intuitions would seem remiss if those 
intuitions, observed or felt, were then regarded as unclouded moral guid-
ance for shaping new laws. 
After Part I elaborates on this study’s design, Part II will detail its 
ﬁndings and limitations, while the Conclusion will highlight unanswered 
questions and fanciful extensions for the future. 
I. THE DILEMMA AND THE DECISION 
Can our moral intuitions about driverless car dilemmas be inﬂu-
enced by the presence of the law? This study’s design isolates the impact 
of providing information about the law by presenting survey subjects with 
the same ﬁctional dilemma, while randomizing what the scenario says 
about the law. The story reads: 
 
Please imagine this scene in the near future, when driverless cars are 
very common. 
 
A driverless car is traveling at a normal speed along a two-lane road in 
the countryside. It is driven entirely by an artiﬁcial intelligence system 
known as Charlie. The owner of the car is sitting as a passenger in the 
back seat. (There is no longer a steering wheel, in cars like this.) 
 
Two bicyclists are traveling in the same direction, ahead of the car, 
along a bike trail on the right side of the road. Nobody else is nearby. 
 
                                                                                                                           
cf. Gary Marcus, Moral Machines, New Yorker (Nov. 24, 2012), https://www.newyorker. 
com/news/news-desk/moral-machines [https://perma.cc/G4TR-U9ZV] (arguing that 
“[b]uilding machines with a conscience is a big job, and one that will require the coordinated 
efforts of philosophers, computer scientists, legislators, and lawyers”). The moral machine 
discourse overlaps with, or is sometimes included within, other headings such as “machine 
ethics” or “robot ethics.” See generally Machine Ethics (Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh 
Anderson, eds., 2011); Robot Ethics 2.0 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins eds., 
2017). 
 9. This suggestion and the possibility of a feedback loop, noted above, are not 
unique to the context of autonomous vehicles. Huang, supra note 4, at 695–97 (raising 
these points in the context of human decisionmakers). In that prior work, I also queried 
whether such a feedback loop might even give rise to multiple equilibria. Id. at 696. But 
just to be clear, neither study has sought to investigate the other side of the loop (how 
moral intuitions about such dilemmas might shape the formation of relevant law). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508903
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A large tree suddenly starts to fall into the road, from the left, a short 
distance in front of the car. Charlie detects the falling tree and swerves 
the car to the right to avoid crashing into it. But now the car is heading 
toward the bicyclists. 
 
Charlie calculates that it has only two options: 
 
1. The car can continue forward. It is slowing down but it cannot stop 
before it reaches the two bicyclists. Charlie predicts that this choice will 
seriously injure both bicyclists. 
 
2. Or the car can swerve again, farther to the right. It will miss the bi-
cyclists but crash hard into a deep ditch. Charlie predicts that this choice 
will seriously injure the passenger in the car. 
 
At this point, the scenario presents the subject with one of three ﬁc-
tional statements about the law. (Note that all labels in curly brackets be-





 The law says that a driverless car must put a priority on protecting its 




 The law says that a driverless car must minimize casualties, without 




 The law does not say anything about what a driverless car must do in a 
situation like this. 
 
Each of these three statements about the law is followed by the last 
sentence in the scenario: 
 
Charlie has to decide what to do. 
 
This closing makes clear to the subject that Charlie is able to make a 
choice that does not comply with the law. After passing a reading 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508903
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comprehension check at this point, the subject is ﬁnally told what Charlie 




Charlie decides to swerve and crash the car into the ditch. This will 
avoid any injury to the two bicyclists, but it will cause serious injuries to 
the passenger in the car. 
 
The subject then answers the central question of interest: Whether 
Charlie’s decision is “morally prohibited,” “morally permissible,” or 
“morally required.”11 These three answer options follow standard termi-
nology in the moral philosophy literature.12 The subjects are also re-
quired to supply a brief explanation for their answer, as a way to encour-
age them to reﬂect on the dilemma.13 
                                                                                                                           
 10. It is possible that for some subjects the reading comprehension question, which 
asks about the law-related information in the story, may have the quality of a demand 
characteristic—that is, some subjects might feel that the researcher would like to see if 
they will state a moral intuition aligned with the law, or contrarily, that the researcher 
would like to see if they can put the law out of their mind when answering a question 
about morality. Such a concern cannot be ruled out but may be somewhat reduced here, 
given that these surveys were distributed online by a third-party survey ﬁrm, and that both 
the subjects’ and the researchers’ identities were kept conﬁdential from each other. 
 11. Note again that this is a question about the morality of the choice that Charlie 
has already made; it is not a question about what Charlie should do next. Yet, given that 
the scenario is set in the future, for some subjects it is possible that answering this retro-
spective question engages an impulse to press for one of the choices prospectively. 
 12. They also mirror the question posed in my prior work. See Huang, supra note 4, 
at 681–83. A note on usage: The term “morally permissible” might be taken to mean “not 
morally prohibited” (and thus including the possibility that the choice is “morally re-
quired”), or it might be used in distinction to “morally required” (that is, meaning 
“morally permissible but not required”). See id. at 683 n.106 (explaining how de-
ontologists have used these terms in the moral philosophy literature). In the survey, it is 
clear that the latter is intended, as all three options are listed, and subjects recognize that 
they can pick only one answer. 
 13. How to interpret the explanations they offer is a trickier question, given doubts 
among moral psychologists about whether such ex post articulations correspond with the 
psychological factors actually driving the moral intuition. See, e.g., Fiery Cushman, Liane 
Young & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: 
Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 Psychol. Sci. 1082, 1082, 1086–88 (2006) (ﬁnding that 
there is a “distinction between the principles that people use” when making moral judg-
ments “and the principles that people articulate” when asked to explain them); Jonathan 
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment, 108 Psychol. Rev. 814, 822–23 (2001) (suggesting that although “the justiﬁca-
tions that people give are closely related to the moral judgments that they make,” it is falla-
cious to assume “that the justiﬁcatory reasons caused the judgments”). 
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A. Survey Design 
Several things about this scenario’s design are worth highlighting. 
First, I have chosen a classic trolley problem setup,14 given its prevalence 
in the discourse as an avatar for a range of dilemmas facing driverless 
cars.15 Some have criticized so-called “trolleyology” on the grounds that 
such no-win accidents would be rare, or that talking about such dilemmas 
might slow the development or adoption of driverless cars.16 And yet 
these scenarios remain a vivid and apt way to capture a concern that 
                                                                                                                           
 14. Trolley problems have been the subject of countless vignette studies and survey 
experiments, including some by legal scholars. See, e.g., John Mikhail, Elements of Moral 
Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal 
Judgment 319–60 (2011); Mark Kelman & Tamar Admati Kreps, Playing with Trolleys: 
Intuitions About the Permissibility of Aggregation, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 197, 
202–21 (2014); Huang, supra note 4, at 680–95. For reviews of the moral psychology or 
experimental philosophy literatures on the trolley problem, see Paul Conway, Jacob 
Goldstein-Greenwood, David Polacek & Joshua D. Greene, Sacriﬁcial Utilitarian 
Judgments Do Reﬂect Concern for the Greater Good: Clariﬁcation via Process 
Dissociation and the Judgments of Philosophers, 179 Cognition 241, 241–42 (2018); Fiery 
Cushman & Liane Young, The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality, 12 
Ethical Theory & Moral Prac. 9, 9–15 (2009). The broader literature on trolley problems is 
vast, of course, in multiple disciplines. See Huang, supra note 4, at 659–80 (reviewing and 
discussing a small sampling of the many works in moral philosophy, moral psychology or 
experimental philosophy, and law, including the pioneering efforts of philosophers 
Philippa Foot, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Frances Kamm). 
 15. See, e.g., Cade Metz, Self-Driving Cars Will Teach Themselves to Save Lives—But 
Also Take Them, Wired (June 9, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/self-driving-cars-
will-power-kill-wont-conscience/ [https://perma.cc/3W35-C5JC] (“If you follow the on-
going creation of self-driving cars, then you probably know about the classic thought 
experiment called the Trolley Problem.”). Much early credit for popularizing the trolley 
problem’s application to self-driving-car dilemmas goes to the efforts of philosopher 
Patrick Lin, among others. See, e.g., Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, Atlantic 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-of-
autonomous-cars/280360 [https://perma.cc/7CVA-9P7T]. More recent media attention has 
been drawn to these dilemmas by the work of the Moral Machine team at MIT and their 
collaborators. See Caroline Lester, A Study on Driverless-Car Ethics Offers a Troubling Look 
into Our Values, New Yorker (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/science/ 
elements/a-study-on-driverless-car-ethics-offers-a-troubling-look-into-our-values [https://perma. 
cc/JJ96-CDCG] (profiling the team as well as its recent work). 
 16. See, e.g., Bryant Walker Smith, The Trolley and the Pinto: Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis in 
Automated Driving and Other Cyber-Physical Systems, 4 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 197, 200 (2017) 
(describing how “[t]his popular preoccupation has created the expectation that every 
conceivable ethical quandary must be identiﬁed and satisfactorily resolved before an auto-
mated system should or even can be deployed”); Frank Pasquale, Get off the Trolley 
Problem, Slate (Oct. 18, 2016), https://slate.com/technology/2016/10/self-driving-cars-
shouldnt-have-to-choose-who-to-protect-in-a-crash.html [https://perma.cc/C8CS-SMTB] 
(arguing that “worry over trolley problems should not freeze autonomous car initiatives” 
given that “[h]uman error is the root cause of thousands of traffic deaths each year”); see 
also Lauren Cassani Davis, Would You Pull the Switch? Does It Matter?, Atlantic (Oct. 9, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/trolley-problem-history-
psychology-morality-driverless-cars/409732/ [https://perma.cc/5WB5-3YDA] (reviewing the 
history and critiques of “trolleyology” and commenting on its newfound relevance in the 
context of autonomous vehicles). 
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future adopters of driverless cars will likely have on their minds: Will this 
car put a priority on saving me and my family, as its passengers, or will it 
save other people at our expense?17 
Second, the scenario is designed to focus attention on the core di-
lemma while avoiding other moral complications. It uses a falling tree to 
start the accident,18 for example, in order to keep all the humans in-
volved mostly blameless.19 For the same reason, the decision is said to be 
Charlie’s alone, with no possibility of the passenger grabbing a steering 
wheel and taking over. In addition, the people in the accident arena are 
generic (none of them is said to be a child, for example),20 and the vic-
tims would be seriously injured (not killed) in Charlie’s predictions.21 
Finally, the sequence of events, with the car ﬁrst swerving to avoid the 
                                                                                                                           
17. Others have also defended the usefulness of considering trolley problem–like di-
lemmas on the grounds that anticipatory programming for such scenarios is necessary for 
autonomous vehicles (unlike human drivers making emergency split-second decisions), 
and that such dilemmas are not to be taken literally as rare edge cases but rather as intui-
tion pumps or thought experiments representing a wide range of pervasive harm–harm 
trade-offs. See, e.g., Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff & Iyad Rahwan, The Trolley, 
the Bull Bar, and Why Engineers Should Care About the Ethics of Autonomous Cars, 107 
Proc. IEEE 502, 503 (2019) (arguing for the relevance of the moral reasoning generated 
by considering trolley problem dilemmas, despite their seeming unreality, for making 
practical decisions both about harm–harm trade-offs as well as “statistical trolley di-
lemma[s],” or risk–risk trade-offs); Bryan Casey, Amoral Machines, or: How Roboticists Can 
Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Law, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. Online 231, 239 (2017), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=
nulr_online [https://perma.cc/669R-3RL6] (arguing that “while society as a whole may 
remain agnostic to the trolley problem, engineers at the cutting edge of robotics are af-
forded no such luxury” because “trolley-like problems are not mere philosophical curiosi-
ties” but instead “are real-world contingencies that require prospective programming”); 
Samantha Godwin, Ethics and Public Health of Driverless Vehicle Collision Programming, 86 
Tenn. L. Rev. 135, 143 (2018) (noting that “[s]omeone has to decide in advance what a driver-
less vehicle will do in situations where the vehicle cannot avoid a crash altogether but can select 
what object or person it will collide with”); Patrick Lin, Robot Cars and Fake Ethical Dilemmas, 
Forbes (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/patricklin/2017/04/03/robot-cars-and-
fake-ethical-dilemmas/ [https://perma.cc/YP7Z-YX2L] (defending the relevance of self-
driving-car dilemmas on various grounds). 
 18. The surprise of the falling tree also limits a reﬂex people may have to say that 
Charlie should have anticipated the dangers ahead or should have been driving more 
slowly. That way of blaming Charlie would tend to bypass the presented dilemma. 
 19. Or at least, to make any possible blame a bit more remote—say, if one wanted to 
blame the bicyclists for being there somehow, or to blame the car owner for putting yet 
another driverless car on the roads. 
 20. The passenger is identiﬁed as the car’s owner, however, both because that tends 
to be the relevant concern in the discourse and because it might be too easy for people to 
approve of sacriﬁcing an unrelated passenger in lieu of two also-unrelated bicyclists. I also 
set the trade-off at two-to-one, to make it a bit of a harder case than the usual ﬁve-to-one 
trolley problem. 
 21. It seemed a bit more plausible to say that the AI system could predict serious 
injuries than that it could predict certain death. Predicting injury rather than death also 
seemed a bit less likely to prompt the reader to infer that the car was going too fast to be 
safe (than if death were so easily predictable). 
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tree, is designed to blur several binaries that are usually central to trolley 
problems—distinctions between act versus omission, killing versus letting 
die, and intended effects versus side effects.22 Downplaying these distinc-
tions allows more of a focus on the desired contest between the princi-
ples of “protecting the passenger” and “minimizing casualties.” 
Third, I have left it to the subject’s imagination how sophisticated 
Charlie is, aside from saying that it can drive a car on its own. In particu-
lar, the scenario does not say anything about Charlie’s moral program-
ming, nor about how Charlie “thinks” (beyond its ability to predict in-
juries). This is meant to approximate the degree of mystery or opacity 
that will naturally attend our interactions with such an advanced AI sys-
tem; when driverless cars have become commonplace, how many people 
will really understand how the AI pilot learned to drive?23 But I did name 
it Charlie, just as Alexa and Siri have names;24 and I also describe Charlie 
as “ha[ving] to decide what to do.” Both of these latter touches may en-
hance a tendency toward anthropomorphism in how some subjects view 
Charlie, though neither seems unusual even in the context of today’s 
technology.25 
                                                                                                                           
 22. To elaborate: The car has already “acted” by swerving away from the tree in order 
to save the passenger; this muddies the intuition that the car would then merely be passive 
in continuing straight ahead to hit the bikers (letting them die, so to speak, by omission) 
rather than swerving again to sacriﬁce the passenger. Put differently, the initial swerving is 
intended to undermine the sense that there is one outcome that is obviously the natural 
course of things. (Is the natural course of things that the passenger remains safe after the 
car has initially swerved from the tree, or would it have been the natural course of things 
for the passenger to be injured by the crash with the tree?) The inclusion of an initial 
swerve may also help balance the two choices in terms of which injuries can be seen as an 
unintended side effect of saving someone else (as relevant to the doctrine of double 
effect): After the ﬁrst swerve, it is possible to view the bicyclists’ injuries (from the car) as a 
side effect of saving the passenger (from the tree), if Charlie drives the car forward; yet it 
is also possible to view the passenger’s injuries (in the ditch) as a side effect of saving the 
bicyclists (from the car), if Charlie swerves a second time. For further discussion of these 
classic distinctions and how to blur them, see Huang, supra note 4, at 668–75 (describing 
philosopher Frances Kamm’s ingenious example of a “bystanding driver” as well as the 
doctrine of double effect). 
 23. It would be interesting in future work, however, to test how our moral judgments 
might be affected by various forms of “explainability”—for example, if Charlie were able 
to present a reason or justiﬁcation for its decision. For explorations of explainability in 
this Symposium, see, for example, Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable 
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1829, 1830 (2019) (arguing that judges should 
play a leading role in developing rules for explainable AI); Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1851, 1871–79 
(2019) (assessing how the delegation and distribution of decisionmaking powers can 
complicate the role of explainability). 
 24. As of the time of this study, the name “Charlie” did not seem to be associated 
with any well-known AI or machine-learning endeavor in the public eye. 
 25. For example, it does not seem strange today to hear someone say, in a car, “Waze 
just changed its mind, because it sees an accident up ahead.” 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508903
1820 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1811 
 
B. Survey Population 
The survey subjects are adults living across the United States; they 
are volunteers recruited by the survey ﬁrm SurveyMonkey,26 which 
approximated census-based age and gender distributions.27 The sample 
analyzed below excludes anyone who did not complete the survey or who 
said that they could not take it seriously;28 anyone who had taken another 
survey recently about a similar driverless car dilemma; anyone who failed 
a comprehension question about the scenario; and anyone who had at-
tended law school or taken courses on artiﬁcial intelligence. The result-
ing sample includes 952 subjects, 59% of whom are women. 
C. Predictions 
What should we expect to see, in comparing across the three condi-
tions, if telling people about the law inﬂuences their moral intuitions 
about Charlie’s decision? It may be useful to consider two possible modes 
of such inﬂuence. First, knowing what the law says may exert a direc-
tional pull toward the moral judgments that align with the law’s com-
mand and away from those that conﬂict with it. Second, if the law takes 
no stance, or if it expressly permits any action, then it may exert a pull 
toward moral neutrality and away from the moral poles.29 
Various psychological mechanisms may interact to generate a direc-
tional inﬂuence from law’s command, in ways that no doubt vary from 
person to person:30 Some may see the law as a source of moral guidance, 
                                                                                                                           
 26. The subjects are volunteers in the sense that they are not paid for the time spent, 
nor paid a piece rate for each survey completed; rather, they are rewarded by 
SurveyMonkey in the following ways: A charitable donation is made for each survey com-
pleted, or they are entered in a sweepstakes. There is therefore a possibility that this survey 
population is somewhat more charitably inclined, or more interested in the offered sweep-
stakes program, than other people. 
 27. Because the surveys were conducted online, however, the sample may lean toward 
those who have smart phones or home computers, and toward those who are comfortable 
with an online interface. 
 28. A question expressly asked the subjects to conﬁrm that they did take the survey 
seriously (or to say no), recognizing that everything in the scenarios was imaginary and set 
in the future. 
 29. These two modes of inﬂuence were articulated in my prior work involving a hu-
man decisionmaker in classic trolley dilemmas. Huang, supra note 4, at 688–90 (describ-
ing the possibility of a “directional inﬂuence” and of a “pull of neutrality”). The 
discussion above, however, ignores two further possibilities. First, some people may hold a 
contrarian or oppositional attitude toward the law; and for any number of reasons, the 
law’s instruction might generate reactance or backlash, boosting the opposed moral intui-
tion or suppressing the aligned intuition. Second, there may be a crowding-out effect 
whereby the law’s presence dampens the need for moral judgment. To the extent these 
seem plausible, one might interpret the observations in this study as net of such effects, 
but this study is unable to isolate them. 
 30. This study is not designed to sort among these mechanisms or their interactions. 
Trying to do so would be a worthy, if perhaps daunting, aim for future extensions. For 
recent work critically surveying and contributing to various literatures about the 
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as a supplier of moral reasons, or as social proof of moral norms. Others 
may focus on a moral duty to obey the law, or they may view the costs of 
liability as morally relevant. For still others, the law might deﬁne social 
roles in a way that deserves moral respect, or it might more subtly affect 
moral psychology by implicitly establishing what is normal and what is a 
deviation.31 
If such sources of the law’s directional inﬂuence are at work, we 
might expect the {Protect passengers} condition to tip some subjects to-
ward saying that Charlie’s choice to sacriﬁce the passenger is “morally 
prohibited” and to tip some away from saying that it is “morally re-
quired.”32 Likewise, we might expect the {Minimize casualties} condition 
to tip some subjects toward saying that the decision is “morally required” 
and to tip some away from saying that it is “morally prohibited.” Accord-
ingly, the predictions for a comparison of the {Protect passengers} and 
{Minimize casualties} conditions are straightforward: The former should 
show more subjects saying that the sacriﬁce is “morally prohibited,” and 
the latter should show more saying that it is “morally required.”33 
But what about comparisons with the {No laws} condition? This 
condition can be seen as a sort of neutral comparator, but with a cautious 
eye, as it is not an entirely natural baseline:34 If subjects expect the law to 
                                                                                                                           
psychological internalization of law, see generally Yuval Feldman, The Law of Good People 
(2018); Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Powers of Law (2015); Frederick Schauer, 
The Force of Law (2015); Bilz & Nadler, supra note 6. 
 31. Deﬁning what is normal, in this sense, may inﬂuence moral judgments through 
the act–omission distinction by setting an expectation about the natural course of things. 
As Professor Ronald Dworkin observed about the classic trolley problem: 
It is unclear what it means to let nature take its course. If it is natural to 
try to rescue ﬁve people at the cost of one, then throwing the switch is 
letting nature take its course. But perhaps “nature” means nonintelli-
gent nature, so that a potential rescuer lets nature take its course by pre-
tending that he is not there. But why should he? 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 298–99 (2011); cf. Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe, 
Normality: Part Descriptive, Part Prescriptive, 167 Cognition 25, 26–32 (2017) (providing 
experimental evidence for the argument “that people’s normality judgments take into 
account both descriptive considerations (e.g., the statistical notion of the average) and 
more prescriptive considerations (e.g., what is morally ideal)”). 
 32. The expected effect of the {Protect passengers} condition on the share saying 
“morally permissible” could go either way, depending on whether more switch away from 
that category into “morally prohibited” or more switch in from “morally required.” And 
the same reasoning applies, with switches in the other direction, for the {Minimize 
casualties} condition. 
 33. As explained, the expected effect of either condition on the share saying 
“morally permissible” is ambiguous. 
 34. Nonetheless, it still seems more informative for this thought experiment than 
other imaginable candidates for a neutral comparator. For example, an alternative might 
be to ask subjects to read the scenario without any mention of the law at all; yet that condi-
tion would be tricky to interpret as a baseline because its meaning would depend on what 
subjects are implicitly assuming about the background law (of the future)—a complication 
that is highlighted by this study’s ﬁndings of law’s inﬂuence on moral intuitions. 
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say something about safety priorities, at a time when driverless cars are 
common, then the {No laws} condition may suggest an implicit societal 
choice to deem any policy—prioritizing passengers, or minimizing 
casualties, or anything else—to be acceptable.35 If so, the {No laws} condi-
tion may exert a pull of neutrality, drawing subjects away from the moral 
poles and toward the “morally permissible” answer. Comparisons of the 
{No laws} condition with the others, then, would be showing the net ef-
fects of law’s directional inﬂuences and such a pull of neutrality. 
II. LAW’S INFLUENCE 
Telling people different things about the law leads to different moral 
judgments about Charlie’s decision to sacriﬁce its sole passenger to save 
the two bicyclists. As seen in Table 1 and Figure 1, a comparison of the 
{Protect passengers} and the {Minimize casualties} conditions conﬁrms 
the presence of law’s directional pull.36 The proportion of subjects who 
say that Charlie’s decision is “morally prohibited” rises from 9% in the 
{Minimize casualties} condition to 16% in the {Protect passengers} condi-
tion.37 Meanwhile, the proportion who say that the decision is “morally 
required” rises from 31% in the {Protect passengers} condition to 45% in 
the {Minimize casualties} condition.38 Put differently, in the {Protect 
passengers} condition, there are about twice as many subjects saying the 
decision is “morally required” as saying “morally prohibited”; whereas in 
the {Minimize casualties} condition, that ratio increases to ﬁve times as 
many. 
One might also compare each of these law conditions with the {No 
laws} condition—keeping in mind both that it is not an especially natural 
baseline and that the possibility of a pull of neutrality may complicate 
interpretation. Relative to {No laws}, the {Protect passengers} condition 
raises the share of subjects saying the decision is “morally prohibited” 
from 8% to 16%;39 meanwhile, the share saying “morally required” does 
not seem to change by much.40 Relative to the {No laws} condition, the 
                                                                                                                           
 35. This expectation may be lessened, however, by the fact that the survey subjects 
know they are taking a survey with an invented story—one that seems focused on the mo-
rality of the choice—and thus some may take the {No laws} statement as a cue to try to put 
any worry about the law out of their minds. This suggestion is purely speculative, of course. 
 36. In a comparison of the {Protect passengers} and {Minimize casualties} conditions, 
there is no extra complication from the possibility of a pull of neutrality, as there will be in 
comparisons with the {No laws} condition. 
 37. ߯2(1, N = 642) = 7.82, p = 0.005. Pearson’s chi-squared tests are reported through-
out. Note that the standard error for any individual proportion ݌̂ is given by the usual 
formula, the square root of ݌̂(1- ݌̂) / N. 
 38. ߯2(1, N = 642) = 14.25, p < 0.001. 
 39. ߯2(1, N = 621) = 10.04, p = 0.002. 
 40. ߯2(1, N = 621) = 1.30, p = 0.254. The standard reminder applies, throughout 
these analyses, that the lack of a statistically signiﬁcant effect is not the same as evidence of 
zero effect. 
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{Minimize casualties} condition increases the share saying “morally re-
quired” from 35% to 45%;41 meanwhile, the share saying “morally 
prohibited” seems about the same.42 One possible explanation for these 
contrasts (between measurable change on one margin and a lack thereof 
on the other) is that some subjects are unmoved in their moral intuitions 
by hearing about a contrary law;43 but another possibility is that a pull of 













Protect passengers 16.4% 53.1% 30.6% 311 
Minimize casualties 9.1% 45.9% 45.0% 331 
No laws 8.1% 57.1% 34.8% 310 
 
  
                                                                                                                           
 41. ߯2(1, N = 641) = 6.90, p = 0.009. 
 42. ߯2(1, N = 641) = 0.20, p = 0.652. 
 43. That is, it may be that those answering “morally required” in the {No laws} 
condition are not easily moved by hearing about the {Protect passengers} law, and those 
answering “morally prohibited” are not easily moved by hearing about the {Minimize 
casualties} law. 
 44. To elaborate: Some subjects in the {Protect passengers} or {Minimize casualties} 
conditions, being no longer drawn toward the “morally permissible” answer by the pull of 
neutrality exerted by the {No laws} condition, may be inclined to choose one of the polar 
categories instead. Thus, in comparing the {No laws} and {Protect passengers} conditions, 
the observed shift toward “morally prohibited” might be due both to the law’s directional 
inﬂuence and to relief from the pull of neutrality; whereas movement away from “morally 
required” might be offset by relief from the pull of neutrality. Likewise, in comparing the 
{No laws} and {Minimize casualties} conditions, the observed shift toward “morally 
required” might be due both to the law’s directional inﬂuence and to relief from the pull 
of neutrality; whereas movement away from “morally prohibited” might be offset by relief 
from the pull of neutrality. 
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A. Whose Moral Responsibility? 
If someone says that Charlie’s decision is “morally prohibited,” 
whom do they blame? A follow-up question immediately after the main 
moral judgment question asks subjects to identify who “they think should 
bear some moral responsibility for that choice.” Subjects may choose as 
many of the four given options as they see ﬁt, and they may also choose 
“none of the above”; an open-ended text box invites them to suggest any-
one else. Across the three conditions, 11% named Charlie as sharing in 
the moral responsibility; 66% named the company that created Charlie; 
32% named the owner of the driverless car; 43% named the lawmakers; 
and 6% said none of the above.45 (The shares do not add to one because 
the options are not mutually exclusive.) 
These numbers should be taken with a grain of salt because the four 
answer options were preselected for the subjects. Still, looking at the rela-
tive attributions, two things seem to stand out:46 First, lawmakers absorb a 
decent share of the assignment of moral responsibility—somewhat less 
than the company, but more than the car’s owner. This ﬁnding speaks to 
a provocative question raised in this Symposium by Professor Tim Wu, 
who wonders whether in the near future the various defaults set by perva-
sive AI decisionmaking, through our acquiescence to them, will super-
sede the role of human-made law.47 One might see this ﬁnding as a sign 
that the future public will not so readily let lawmakers off the hook, even 
when everyone knows that the AI systems will really be making the deci-
sions. Or, from the perspective of the present, this ﬁnding may be seen as 
an expression of a generalized desire for lawmakers to deal with these 
hard questions before an AI does someday.48 
                                                                                                                           
 45. To be clear, these are shares of the subjects who say that Charlie’s decision is 
“morally prohibited”—that is, those who morally object to the sacriﬁce of the passenger—
across all three law conditions. This is not to ignore the distinction between moral blame 
and moral responsibility; for example, it would be coherent to ask subjects to assign moral 
responsibility for a blameless or a laudable decision (or even for a decision that has yet to 
be made). 
 46. By relative attribution, I mean comparing the shares of people who assigned 
some moral responsibility to each of the four preselected actors. (The ordering of the four 
options is scrambled randomly for each subject.) Note, however, that these data do not tell 
us about the relative intensity of attribution. For example, a subject who names both 
Charlie and the car’s owner might feel that the former bears less responsibility and the 
latter bears more; this difference would not appear in the data. 
 47. As Professor Wu puts it: “Many of the developments that go under the banner of 
artiﬁcial intelligence that matter to the legal system are not so much new means of break-
ing the law but of bypassing it as a means of enforcing rules and resolving disputes.” Tim 
Wu, Will Artiﬁcial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 
119 Colum. L. Rev. 2001, 2001 (2019) (citation omitted). The challenge to the legal 
system, then, would become the “existential challenge of supersession [by software].” Id. 
 48. In concept it would be informative to consider each law condition separately, 
although in reality many more grains of salt must be taken, given the tiny sizes of the 
resulting subsamples—and again, we are only considering those subjects who answered 
“morally prohibited,” the composition of whom differs across conditions. If one is willing 
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Second, these data suggest that people will not shy away from assign-
ing moral responsibility to the creators of the AI—and for some people, 
even to the AI itself—for the choices made in such a dilemma.49 Notably, 
among the options given, the company that created Charlie drew an 
attribution of moral responsibility from the most people. And even 
Charlie itself was named as morally responsible in part, by a small share 
of subjects. These relative attributions reﬂect how we currently envision 
the sophistication of such future AI pilots and how we imagine they 
might make such decisions.50 As of now, it seems that relatively few sub-
jects consider the AI itself to qualify as a moral agent. But in coming 
years, as we grow increasingly familiar with highly advanced and lifelike 
AI interfaces, one can only guess how our anthropomorphic imagina-
tions might become more willing to assign moral agency to something—
or will we say someone—like Charlie. 
B. Limitations 
Three sets of limitations are worth emphasizing. First, the standard 
disclaimer applies: What people say after reading a vignette might not 
reﬂect how they would react if similar events occurred in real life; and all 
the more so, for a story set in the future. In particular, this study’s obser-
vations might be over- or understated, depending on various factors. For 
example, they might be overstated relative to a study in a natural setting 
(of future survey subjects) where people might not be paying much 
attention to the law. On the other hand, they might be understated rela-
tive to a future survey conducted after subjects have already had years of 
                                                                                                                           
to proceed with enough healthy skepticism: In the {Minimize casualties} condition, 50% of 
subjects assigned some moral responsibility to the lawmakers (N = 30); this may be 
unsurprising, as what the law says is also what Charlie actually does. In the {No laws} 
condition, 36% named the lawmakers (N = 25), which one might interpret as frustration 
for a failure of lawmaking. And yet there also seems to be ample attribution in the {Protect 
passengers} condition, with 43% naming the lawmakers as sharing in moral responsibility 
(N = 51), even though these subjects should be approving of the law, and even though 
Charlie’s decision actually violates the law. To speculate, it thus seems possible that some 
sort of even more generalized attribution of moral responsibility to lawmakers is at work—
perhaps for enabling such an AI-dominated state of the world in the ﬁrst place. 
 49. In their Symposium contributions, Professors Mala Chatterjee and Jeanne 
Fromer, as well as Professor Frank Pasquale, pose hard questions about the gaps in moral 
and legal accountability that might appear when we delegate decisionmaking to an AI. See 
Mala Chatterjee & Jeanne C. Fromer, Minds, Machines, and the Law: The Case of Volition 
in Copyright Law, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1887, 1887 (2019) (discussing whether machines can 
be deemed to have mental states of the sort that would allow attributions of moral agency 
or of legal liability to them); Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 
119 Colum. L. Rev. 1917, 1917 (2019) (discussing the potential for gaps in liability and 
responsibility when decisions are delegated to AI systems). This study’s ﬁndings on the 
assignment of moral responsibility may be useful in calibrating such concerns, though of 
course it remains an open question how the future public will make such attributions. 
 50. As noted above, the scenario intentionally says very little about how Charlie 
“thinks”⎯leaving this largely to the subject’s imagination. See supra note 23 and accom-
panying text. 
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life experience with both driverless cars and the laws governing them. 
(That is to say, it may be expecting a lot of the present-day survey subjects 
to internalize an imaginary law of the future.) Moreover, the way the law 
is described in this study, without any mention of enforcement or liabil-
ity, might also result in some understatement relative to a study with a 
more fully described legal regime—or relative to a future study done 
when those facts have become common knowledge.51 
Second, this study is not designed to sort among the possible mecha-
nisms of the law’s halo. Do some subjects draw moral guidance or reason-
ing from what the law says? Do others see the law as a sign of society’s 
moral norms? For some subjects, does the law implicitly set what is nor-
mal and what is deviant? For others, does it deﬁne social roles in a mor-
ally relevant way? Do some subjects place moral weight on the conse-
quences of liability? Do others simply consider it a moral obligation to 
obey the law? Such psychological pathways may vary from person to per-
son, and others may well be possible. Moreover, it goes without saying 
that while this study is designed to focus on the role of the law, many 
other sources of inﬂuence on our moral intuitions are worthy of study—
and they may interact or interfere with the mechanisms of the law’s halo 
in intriguing ways.  
Third, there are limits of scope and generalizability. This survey in-
cludes only one scenario and focuses on only one decision by the AI; it 
also only considers two possible laws. Further work involving other varia-
tions of such dilemmas, and other possible laws or assignments of liabil-
ity, is needed before any broad generalizations should be ventured.52 
Along these lines, a few suggestions follow. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay presents an initial set of evidence suggesting that our 
moral intuitions about driverless car dilemmas can be inﬂuenced by the 
presence of the law. As this is but a single study, the most useful way to 
conclude may be to suggest a few dimensions of possible variation for 
                                                                                                                           
 51. See Huang, supra note 4, at 691–95 (showing evidence suggesting larger 
differences between contrasting law conditions when subjects are told that the deciding 
actor will be held liable than when subjects are told that there will be no liability despite 
what the law says). This study left liability open-ended in order to allow measuring of the 
subjects’ natural tendencies in attributing moral responsibility. See supra section II.A. It 
would be an interesting extension to see if expressly assigning legal liability to a given 
actor might affect subjects’ assignments of moral responsibility. 
 52. While in prior work I have used survey experiments to explore the law’s halo in a 
classic trolley dilemma, to my knowledge this study is the only one to have done so in the 
context of a driverless car dilemma. A different but related inquiry—about how the legal 
status of potential victims affects people’s normative choices about whom to sacriﬁce (for 
example, whether people are less willing to save a jaywalker, or a criminal, relative to other 
potential victims)—has generated interesting ﬁndings in the MIT Moral Machine project. 
See Awad et al., supra note 8, at 59−63. 
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future work: First, different laws can be tested. For example, what if the 
law allows the car owner to control the “morality setting,” dialing up or 
down the degree of priority for the passengers over outsiders? Second, 
other trade-offs can be posed. For example, the dilemma might involve 
increasing or decreasing risks, rather than causing harm for certain.53 
Third, the humans involved can be described with more morally relevant 
details. For example, what if the owner had bought this car believing that 
Charlie would put a priority on protecting passengers over protecting 
others? Or what if the passenger is in the driver’s seat, and there is a 
steering wheel—but he declines to take over from the AI? And fourth, 
the AI’s capabilities can be more fully speciﬁed. For example, what if it is 
known that Charlie learned to drive from watching millions of hours of 
videos of humans driving? Or what if Charlie is constrained to obey the 
law at all times? Or what if Charlie is not only the driver of a car, but an 
all-purpose companion who could easily pass the Turing test in conversa-
tion—even when discussing timeless moral dilemmas? 
                                                                                                                           
 53. For example, the car may be choosing whether to drive a bit to the left within its 
highway lane, closer to a motorcyclist on that side, and a bit more distant from a tractor-
trailer on the right side; this trades off risk to the motorcyclist with risk to the car’s passen-
gers. See Bonnefon et al., supra note 17, at 503 (describing such a scenario as one exam-
ple of a “statistical trolley dilemma”); cf. Barbara H. Fried, What Does Matter? The Case for 
Killing the Trolley Problem (or Letting It Die), 62 Phil. Q. 505, 506 (2012) (arguing that 
trolley-like thought experiments are limited in real-world relevance because they do not 
cover cases of “uncertain risk of accidental harm to generally unidentiﬁed others”). 
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